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AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz 
ABSTRACT—Derogating legal scholarship has become something of a sport 
for leading figures in the federal judiciary. Perhaps the chief antagonist in 
recent years has been the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, John G. 
Roberts, Jr., whose most recent salvo includes the claim that because law 
review articles are not of interest to the bench, he has trouble remembering 
the last law review article he read. This claim, and others by the Chief 
Justice, may represent the end of an uneasy détente concerning the topic of 
the utility of legal scholarship to the bench and bar. At a minimum, Chief 
Justice Roberts’s recent comments represent an invitation to a discussion, 
which this Article accepts. To that discussion we contribute an empirical 
study that is based on an original and unprecedented body of data derived 
from every Supreme Court decision over the last sixty-one years. This study 
makes two major contributions. The first is evidence describing the amount 
and patterns of the Supreme Court’s use of legal scholarship over the last 
sixty-one years. The second, and perhaps most striking, contribution of this 
Article is empirical evidence on the nature and quality of the Court’s use of 
scholarship. This Article provides the first report, as far as we can 
determine, of evidence that the Court not only often uses legal scholarship, 
it also disproportionately uses scholarship when cases are either more 
important or more difficult to decide. It thus presents results that contradict 
claims that scholarship is useless or irrelevant to judges and practitioners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In May 2011, the New York Times reported that Chief Justice John G. 
Roberts, Jr. stated, “What the academy is doing, as far as I can tell . . . is 
largely of no use or interest to people who actually practice law.”1 About a 
month after that, in June 2011, Chief Justice Roberts claimed that because 
law review articles are not of interest to the bench or the bar, he has trouble 
remembering the last law review article he read.2 The Chief Justice has also 
contended that legal scholarship is not “particularly helpful for practitioners 
and judges.”3 
To be fair, Chief Justice Roberts is not the first judge to claim that 
legal scholarship is useless or irrelevant. In the past, other judges have been 
similarly dismissive,4 as have some legal academics5 and representatives of 
 
1  Adam Liptak, Keep Those Briefs Brief, Literary Justices Advise, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2011, at 
A12 (quoting Chief Justice Roberts). 
2  John Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks at the Annual Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference 28:45–32:05 (June 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.cspan.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1; see 
also Jess Bravin, Chief Justice Roberts on Obama, Justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More, WALL ST. J. L. 
BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justice-roberts-on-obama-
justice-stevens-law-reviews-more (contending that legal scholarship is not “particularly helpful for 
practitioners and judges”). 
3  Bravin, supra note 2. 
4  See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal 
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 35 (1992) (“[J]udges, administrators, legislators, and practitioners have 
little use for much of the scholarship . . . produced by members of the academy.”); Judith S. Kaye, One 
Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 320 (1989) (expressing 
disappointment over not “find[ing] more in the law reviews that is of value and pertinence to our 
cases”); Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y. 
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the bar.6 But that debate7 had reached something of a stasis—a détente, if an 
uneasy one—well before Chief Justice Roberts arrived on the scene as a 
critic. 
 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (“I haven’t opened up a law review in years . . . . No one speaks of them. 
No one relies on them.” (quoting Chief Judge Dennis G. Jacobs)); see also, e.g., United States v. Six 
Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred & Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in U.S. Currency, 955 
F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I 
suppose, now that many of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-
of-touch faculty members, the temptation for judges to write about issues that interest them—whether or 
not raised by the parties or constituting part of the logic of the decision—is even greater.”); Thomas L. 
Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in Judicial Opinions: A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 547, 
549 (2006) (expressing the concern that law review analysis is “often not only unpersuasive, but even at 
times at odds with accepted means of analysis”); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1320–21 (2002) (expressing concern over the length of law review articles and 
“how unembarrassed the legal writer is to repeat what is well known, how seldom one finds an article 
that begins with a clear statement of what the author thinks the article adds to the existing literature”). 
Which is not to say that all judges disdain legal scholarship. Judge John Minor Wisdom, for 
example, told his law clerks: “Do not, however, be so brief that you neglect to do a thorough job of 
research, including research of the law reviews. I like a good article, comment, or note in point—
regardless of the source. Do not limit yourself to Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Chicago, and Michigan 
reviews.” John Minor Wisdom, Wisdom’s Idiosyncrasies, 109 YALE L.J. 1273, 1278 (2000); see also 
Alex Kozinski, Judge, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 
Address at the University of Houston Law Center Fourth Annual Frankel Lecture, in 37 HOUS. L. REV. 
295, 295 (2000) (joking in his remarks, “Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased to be 
here . . . to speak on the relevance of legal scholarship to the judiciary. I note that whoever came up with 
the topic did not add the qualifier ‘if any,’ which shows a commendable degree of confidence”). 
5  Professor Erik M. Jensen published a law review article in the Journal of Legal Education with the 
sole text: “This is it.” He added in one of his two footnotes: 
A reader suggested to me that this article has insufficient legal content, that ‘Res ipsa loquitur’ (or 
some other pompously legal slogan) would serve my purposes better. But it’s been decades since 
law review articles had to have anything to do with the law. For that matter, it’s been a long time 
since law review articles had to have anything to do with anything. This article has as much 
content as the other stuff in this issue, doesn’t it? 
Erik M. Jensen, The Shortest Article in Law Review History, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156, 156 & n.1 (2000); 
see also David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: 
Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 761, 778 (2005) (claiming that the “trend” toward “not merely unhelpful, but useless” legal 
scholarship is “already apparent” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Others have expressed their 
concerns somewhat more moderately. See, e.g., Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin & Jill Cohen Professor of Law, 
Brooklyn Law Sch., Remarks upon Receiving the Robert C. McKay Law Professor Award, in MARQ. 
LAW., Spring 2009, at 55, 56, available at http://law.marquette.edu/assets/marquette-lawyers/pdf/
marquette-lawyer/2009-spring/Spring09pp55-57.pdf (noting that prestigious law reviews appear less 
interested in publishing traditional doctrinal scholarship and that “young scholars [engaged in such 
scholarship] are justifiably afraid that when tenure time comes around their articles will be viewed as 
pedestrian”). 
6  The famous MacCrate Report on the development of practical skills during formal legal education 
had this to say: “Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as increasingly irrelevant to their 
day-to-day concerns . . . . [M]any practicing lawyers believe law professors are more interested in 
pursuing their own intellectual interests than in helping the legal profession address matters of important 
current concern.” TASK FORCE ON LAW SCH. AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AM. BAR 
ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT 5 (1992).  
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By repeatedly going on the record criticizing legal scholarship, the 
Chief Justice might be attempting to unsettle the détente that has developed 
around the topic of the utility of legal scholarship to the bench and bar. At a 
minimum, it seems he has a desire to engage others in a discussion of the 
utility of legal scholarship. 
This Article contributes to that discussion an empirical analysis of an 
unprecedented body of original data concerning the use of legal scholarship 
in every Supreme Court decision in the last sixty-one years. It offers a 
number of novel observations and makes two major contributions. 
The first contribution describes the amount and patterns of use of legal 
scholarship by the Court: 
1. Over the last sixty-one years, the Supreme Court has used 
legal scholarship in 32.21% of its decisions. 
2. The Supreme Court, on average, uses more than one work of 
legal scholarship per decision. 
3. The overall trend during the last sixty-one years has been an 
increase in the use of legal scholarship by the Supreme Court. 
The second contribution concerns the nature and quality of the Court’s 
use of scholarship—that is, how the Court uses scholarship. We find 
evidence that the Court disproportionately uses scholarship when cases are 
either more important or more difficult to decide as defined by several 
 
7  The field has something of an ad hoc flavor, but for those new to the field, some useful articles to 
start with include the following works: Robert J. Hume, Strategic-Instrument Theory and the Use of 
Non-Authoritative Sources by Federal Judges: Explaining References to Law Review Articles, 31 JUST. 
SYS. J. 291, 298–99 (2010); Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1113 (1981); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 
1835 (1988); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205 (1981); Whit 
D. Pierce & Anne E. Reuben, Empirical Study, The Law Review is Dead; Long Live the Law Review: A 
Closer Look at the Declining Judicial Citation of Legal Scholarship, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185 
(2010). For a comprehensive empirical study revealing that the use of legal scholarship by the federal 
circuit courts has increased since 1950, see David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal 
Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345 (2011). 
For some works making the claim that the use of scholarship by courts is on the decline, see Michael D. 
McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 
659, 660 (1998) (reporting “a 47.35% decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts over the past two 
decades, the most notable decline occurring in the past ten years”), and Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of 
Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971–1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2000) (reporting a 
“continuing decline in [the] number of times the Court cited legal periodicals”). For some articles 
concerning the role of particular scholarship, courts, or materials, see Lawrence M. Friedman et al., 
State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 812–17 (1981) 
(considering scholarship used by state courts); Robert M. Lawless & Ira David, The General Role 
Played by Specialty Law Journals: Empirical Evidence from Bankruptcy Scholarship, 80 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 523, 524 (2006) (summarizing the role of specialty journals); William H. Manz, Citations in 
Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267 (2002) (comparing 
citations in opinions with the use in briefs); and Blake Rohrbacher, Decline: Twenty-Five Years of 
Student Scholarship in Judicial Opinions, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 553 (2006) (considering the role of 
student notes). 
106:995  (2012) Legal Scholarship 
 999 
criteria. In particular, we present evidence that there are strongly significant 
predictive relationships between the use of scholarship by the Court and: 
1. The number of minority votes attending a decision. 
2. Whether a decision alters precedent. 
3. Whether a decision issues in June and July, months suspected 
to include a greater mass of the Court’s more important or 
difficult decisions. 
4. Whether a decision declares acts of Congress, state laws, or 
municipal ordinances unconstitutional. 
5. Whether a decision resolves disagreements at the lower court 
level. 
The Article also offers an interpretation of the evidence. Specifically, 
we conclude that the Court uses legal scholarship rather frequently, and, 
moreover, uses it systematically to support the decisional lawmaking 
process. It follows, we suggest, that legal scholarship is neither useless nor 
irrelevant to the Court. 
From here, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the 
methodology used to gather and analyze our data. Part II presents the results 
and discussion. Part III offers some of our thoughts on directions for future 
work, and the Article finishes with a brief conclusion. 
I. METHODOLOGY 
Our study concerns the use of legal scholarship by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Three definitions are helpful to understanding our study and its 
implications, those for: “decision,” “legal scholarship,” and “use.” 
We generally use the word “decision” in its natural sense: to refer to 
the Court’s entire written work product that attends deciding an appeal.8 It 
thus includes majority, dissenting, and concurring, etc. opinions having to 
do with the Court’s disposition on the merits of an appeal. 
We use the phrase “legal scholarship” to mean law review and law 
journal articles. We broadly define law review and law journal articles to 
encompass all law reviews and journals, including specialty journals.9 We 
have not confined our study to merely the “elite” journals. Our definition 
excludes other works that can be characterized as legal scholarship, such as 
treatises, hornbooks, and scholarly books.10 
 
8  Sometimes we may refer to the act of deciding as “using,” but where we do, the context makes this 
obvious. 
9  “Specialty journals” refers to those legal journals that are “devoted to a particular subject as 
opposed to general journals accepting articles on a wide variety of subjects.” Lawless & David, supra 
note 7, at 523 n.1. 
10  Treatises, hornbooks, and scholarly books are excluded from this study because the literature 
criticizing legal scholarship typically focuses on law review articles and excludes other forms of legal 
scholarship. 
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We have assumed that if a work of legal scholarship is cited in a 
decision, then that scholarship was “used” in the decision. This assumption 
has several important advantages. Most notably, equating “use” and 
“citation” makes measurement easier and almost completely objective. It 
permits us to measure use directly, by examining the content of decisions of 
the Court. 
We recognize that the “citation equals use”11 assumption is imperfect. 
Obviously, there are times when a Justice’s decisional process is influenced 
by legal scholarship but the resulting decision does not expressly evince 
that fact. The Justice may elect not to cite to it, or perhaps the Justice is 
simply unaware of its influence. Alternatively, the influenced Justice might 
not be the author of the decision (and consequently has no opportunity to 
cite the influencing work). For these reasons, we think our measures are 
very likely to locate less use of scholarship than actually occurs. 
It is also worth addressing a notion that is often raised when we present 
work from this project: the notion that the Court might sometimes cite to 
legal scholarship in dicta, or perhaps for the purpose of “tarting up” an 
opinion. In other words, the concern is that the Court cites to scholarship 
when it does not absolutely need to, or perhaps for reasons that are not 
strongly related to the content of the scholarship. We acknowledge that this 
happens at some rate but disagree that such citations can be understood as 
anything other than “use” of the cited scholarship. There is a cost to citing 
anything in an opinion; indeed, there is some cost to every word added to an 
opinion. Reported decisions of the Supreme Court are documents 
evidencing the law, and the decision to cite to scholarship in an opinion 
thus brings the scholarship into close relationship with the law. Nor are 
Justices required to cite to legal scholarship in an opinion, so the decision to 
do so is made in the context of a Justice choosing how to communicate the 
law.12 That choice is part of the process of decisional lawmaking, and we 
think almost indisputably part of the law. 
A. The Dataset 
To analyze the use of legal scholarship, we use a technique known in 
social science literature as “content analysis.” Content analysis refers to the 
general method of selecting documents (such as judicial decisions), 
observing and recording aspects of the content of those documents, and 
 
11  In the remainder of the Article, unless it is obviously otherwise, we use the terms “use” and 
“citation” synonymously. 
12  Nor do we think it is of much moment to the concerns of this study if in some cases citations 
make their way into issued opinions because they are inserted by law clerks into early drafts of opinions. 
It is the Justices, after all, who are responsible for the content of the opinions of the Court, and the 
Justices who are the individuals empowered by the Constitution to decide cases and controversies. Nor 
are we aware of similar criticisms of citations to primary authority that may be initially inserted by law 
clerks. 
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analyzing and drawing inferences about the meaning of the observations.13 
In law, content analysis permits scholars to analyze and make empirical 
observations about large numbers of cases or decisions.14 These empirical 
observations have the benefit of being broad-based and objective, and may 
provide insights well beyond those provided by methods that rely on 
analyzing noteworthy decisions to determine trends in the law.15 
Content analysis of judicial decisions also has limitations and potential 
biases, the most significant of which are unobserved reasoning, selection 
bias, and strategic behavior.16 Among the concerns presented by this study 
 
13  See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008). 
14  The use of empirical evidence in legal scholarship has increased in recent years. E.g., Shari 
Seidman Diamond & Pam Mueller, Empirical Legal Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. 
& SCI. 581, 582 (2010) (“[E]mpirical scholarship reported in law reviews has grown over 
time. . . . [And] it is continuing to grow.”); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the 
Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 477–78 (2009) (“The legal academy 
has recently experienced a surge of interest in quantitative empirical analysis.”). For a list of examples 
of content analysis applied to legal studies, see Hall & Wright, supra note 13, at 69–73. For recent 
examples of legal scholarship that have used content analysis as an approach to examining judicial 
opinions, see John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 (2007) (examining the impact of changing legal rules and legal 
procedure on the doctrine of equivalents); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal 
Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007) (examining 
empirical claims about the role of the suggestions test in considering the nonobviousness requirement of 
patent law); Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical 
Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011) (examining the treatment of inequitable conduct in patent 
law); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051 (2007) (examining empirical claims about 
the nature of the nonobviousness requirement of patent law); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
223 (2008) (examining claim construction in patent case appeals); Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 
7 (examining the judicial use of scholarship in circuit court opinions); and R. Polk Wagner & Lee 
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (examining judicial approaches to claim construction in patent cases 
before the Federal Circuit). 
15  See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An 
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 580–85, 618 (1998) (providing empirical 
evidence that is inconsistent with the claim by scholars who relied on an analysis of noteworthy cases to 
“present evidence of a fundamental misunderstanding” that promissory estoppel was the “dominant” 
ground for enforcing contracts). 
16  See Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 7, at 1355–56; see also Hall & Wright, supra note 13, at 
85–100 (exploring the strengths and weaknesses of content analysis). With respect to our study of the 
Supreme Court, “unobserved reasoning” could occur if the opinion does not accurately state the facts of 
the case or the Justices’ analysis of those facts. Supreme Court opinions are subject to “selection bias” 
because the Court has discretion over the cases it hears and the opinions that it writes. The decision to 
hear a case or write an opinion may be related to factors that affect the content of the Court’s opinion. 
Similarly, Justices may have reasons to elide issues in written decisions, e.g., to wait to discuss the issue 
until a “better” case for considering the particular matter comes along or because the votes for the 
authoring Justice’s preferred holding on an issue are not present and that Justice might rather have no 
substantive holding on an issue than one with which the Justice disagrees. The content of the Court’s 
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is that the Supreme Court “uses” legal scholarship more often than we can 
locate by counting citations17 and that opinions might evince vel non the use 
of scholarship for reasons we cannot observe.18 While these potential 
limitations should not be completely discounted, it must be realized that 
they affect not only content analysis, but also the more conventional forms 
of legal analysis: reading, interpreting, and discussing individual cases. 
Content analysis thus remains an excellent tool for the purpose of our study. 
Given that we are interested in considering the Court’s use of legal 
scholarship over an extended period of time, the method permits us to 
analyze thousands of decisions at once in a manner that is difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve using traditional interpretive methods. 
The dataset utilized in this study comprises information from all of the 
Court’s decisions from June 27, 1949 (Volume 338) through March 4, 2009 
(Volume 555) published in the United States Reporter. As a starting point, 
this study relies on the set of databases contained in “The Spaeth 
Database.”19 The well-known Spaeth Database—considered the “gold 
standard” in political science literature20—has substantial information about 
each Supreme Court decision. It populates over fifty variables for each 
decision, including: the date oral arguments were heard, the date the 
decision was made, the Court Term, the primary legal issue,21 the identity of 
 
opinions may also be affected by “strategic behavior” if Justices are concerned with making the 
judgments expressed in opinions appear to flow naturally from accepted sources using conventional 
analytical steps. 
17  See Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38, 41 
(2006) (“Citations reflect one particular end-use of an article; they do not measure how many times an 
article is read but not cited by a judge or professor.”). 
18  For example, perhaps a Justice writing for the Court might avoid citing legal scholarship, even 
when consciously (or unconsciously) influenced by it, because a citation to the work is inconsistent with 
his stated views on statutory or constitutional interpretation. 
19  See The Genesis of the Database, SUP. CT. DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/about.php?s=1 (last 
visited July 25, 2012). To download the data from the Spaeth Database, see Current Dataset: 2011 
Release 03, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Aug. 30, 2011), http://scdb.wustl.edu/data.php. 
20  For example, leading law and political science professors have noted that, “[I]n the law reviews, 
virtually no empirical study of the U.S. Supreme Court produced by political scientists fails to draw on 
[the Spaeth Database].” Lee Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 783, 812 (2003). 
21  There has been academic debate over the validity of the coding of certain variables in the Spaeth 
Database. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 14, at 490–501, 526–529 (2009) (arguing that the Spaeth 
Database’s coding of legal issues is unreliable and invalid in some instances); Anna Harvey, What 
Makes a Judgment “Liberal”? Coding Bias in the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database (June 
15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120970 (arguing that coding 
of the issues and ideologies in the Spaeth Database may be influenced by the coder’s knowledge of the 
votes of the specific Justices in the case); see also Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, 
Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79 (2010) (empirically testing whether the 
Spaeth Database’s liberal–conservative classification of cases is valid). But see infra note 22 (noting 
political science scholars’ confidence in the database). This debate is largely irrelevant to the study we 
report here because the variables most central to the debate are not material to the analysis we present. 
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the Justice who authored the decision, and the number of dissenting votes in 
each case.22 
We enhanced the Spaeth Database by appending information about the 
amount of legal scholarship used, if any, in each decision of the Court. To 
locate decisions using legal scholarship, we executed a carefully 
constructed query against LexisNexis’s (Lexis) Supreme Court database.23 
After executing the query, we manually reviewed the results and compared 
them to the decisions populating the Spaeth Database. Human coders 
eliminated “false positives”—cases responsive to the electronic search but 
that did not use any legal scholarship.24 Thereafter, human coders recorded 
the number of unique law review articles used in each decision. Thus, for 
each decision, our data include how many distinct law review articles each 
decision uses. Overall, our data include 7730 Supreme Court decisions. 
We tested the reliability of our coding using Cohen’s kappa (k), a 
statistical argument that measures intercoder agreement for categorical 
observations along a 0–1 interval.25 For the variables presented in this 
 
22  To download a codebook for each of the fields in the Spaeth Database, see Supreme Court 
Database Code Book: 2011 Release 03, SUP. CT. DATABASE (Aug. 30, 2011, 1:59 PM), 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/_brickFiles/2011_03/SCDB_2011_03_codebook.pdf. The Supreme Court 
Database website indicates that the coding of the variables is of high reliability, continuously updated, 
and consistently relied upon by political scientists and other scholars analyzing the Supreme Court and 
its Justices. Harold J. Spaeth, Online Code Book—Introduction, SUP. CT. DATABASE, 
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?s=1 (last visited July 25, 2012); The Genesis of the Database, 
supra note 19. 
23  We searched in the Lexis database “USLED.” The Lexis search query for citation to legal 
scholarship in each volume “XXX” of the United States Reports was: 
CITES(XXX pre/1 “U.S.”) and ((“L.J.” or “L. J.” or “L. REV.” or “L.REV.” or “J.L.” or “LAW 
REVIEW” or “Ct.Rev.” or “Ct. Rev.”) w/15 (20** or 19** or 18**)) and not ((“J.L.” w/4 V.) or 
name((J. w/2 L.) or LJ or JL or “L.J.” or “J.L.”) or (counsel(LJ or JL or “L.J.” or “J.L.”)) or 
(“NAT! L.J.” or “NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL”)). 
For our study, we searched volumes 338 through 555 of the United States Reports. The Boolean logic 
behind this search has been reviewed by others. See, e.g., Iantha Haight, Court Citation of Legal 
Scholarship on the Rise?, THE COMPETITIVE EDGE (Aug. 17, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://blog.law.
cornell.edu/library/2010/08/17/court-citation-of-legal-scholarship-on-the-rise (noting that the search 
query was impressive and is “about as close [to perfect] as you can reasonably get”). 
24  There were very few false positives. 
25  See generally Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & 
PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37 (1960) (describing the logic of the statistical argument and defending its 
merits). Cohen’s kappa (k) has the merit of taking into account agreement that occurs by chance, but 
also tends to underestimate agreement when a category is very commonly present. It is thus, generally 
speaking, considered to be a conservative measure of agreement. The closer the kappa statistic is to 1.00, 
the greater the level of agreement. While there is no set k-value that signifies “good enough” agreement, 
magnitude guidelines have been suggested. Richard Landis and Gary Koch suggest that k-values of .00–
.20 reflect “slight” agreement; .21–.40 reflect “fair” agreement; .41–.60 reflect “moderate” agreement; 
.61–.80 reflect “substantial” agreement; and .81–1.00 reflect “almost” perfect agreement. See J. Richard 
Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 
33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977); see also JOSEPH L. FLEISS ET AL., STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES 
AND PROPORTIONS 604 (3d ed. 2003) (describing .40–.75 as fair-to-good and over .75 as excellent). In 
this study, approximately 30% of the measurements were coded by multiple coders to establish 
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Article (and coded by our coding group), the observed k-values across 7730 
decisions and 8 different coders ranged from 1.000 (perfect unity) to .863 
(almost perfect or excellent).26 
B. Statistical Arguments 
The study reported here uses a number of statistical descriptions and 
statistical arguments. Most will be familiar to readers, e.g., tabular displays 
of information such as percentages and counts, and the use of the 
generalized linear model to define relationships between variables. We use 
moving averages27 to describe trends in the Court’s use of scholarship over 
time. Describing the time-series data with a moving average works to 
smooth out short-term fluctuations and, thus, to highlight long-term trends, 
which is precisely what we are trying to describe where we apply this 
technique.28 
In addition to these well-known techniques, we also use a fixed-effects 
multiple regression model to explore the nature and quality of the Court’s 
use of legal scholarship. In this model, we take steps to statistically control 
for the effects of time, the type of legal issue, and the type of law to help 
isolate decisional characteristics that predict the use of scholarship by the 
Court.29 
At times the analysis employs the statistical argument that observations 
are “significant,” a contention that the observations are not simply a product 
of chance. Significance is indicated by the letter p, which stands for 
probability. Any p-value of .05 or lower is considered statistically 
significant because it indicates that the probability that the observations are 
 
reliability. Cf. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 14, at 2074 & n.118 (using a 25% sample and noting 
literature that suggests using at least a 10% sample). 
26  A list of variables used in the study and information concerning intercoder reliability are 
presented in Appendices 1 and 2, respectively. 
27  Moving averages are calculated by averaging the value of a particular variable across a fixed 
subset of data entries, then shifting the subset one entry forward in time and averaging again. The 
averages are recorded and then displayed graphically. For example, the first data point for the 50-
decision moving average in Figure 1 was calculated by determining the average number of decisions 
using legal scholarship for data entries 1–50. The second data point was calculated by determining the 
average number of decisions using legal scholarship for data entries 2–51. The third data point is the 
average of 3–52, and so on. 
28  While we think moving averages present the most accurate description of the time trend, there are 
other possible choices we could have made. For instance, we could have elected to use Term or calendar 
year. We use moving averages instead because of substantial variation in the number of decisions the 
Court issued per Term and per calendar year across our data, and because we think the moving averages 
offer a richer account of the data. Our charts do contain year information, however, for those who are 
interested. 
29  The purpose is to attempt to statistically account for variation in use of scholarship that is 
explained by decisional characteristics such as a given Term and the particular Justices. Variations may 
arise in the Court’s general attitude toward scholarship over time or a disproportionate impact of 
decisions directed to certain issue areas or law types. 
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due to chance is less than 5%. Values between .05 and .1 are considered 
marginal, indicating that the probability that the observations are due to 
chance is between 5% and 10%. 
Additionally, our approach relies heavily on what we think is the most 
natural and generally understandable unit of measure: an individual 
decision of the Court. For example, we report the average number of 
decisions using legal scholarship, the average number of articles used per 
decision, and the moving average for subsets of decisions. Also, the 
response variable in our central regression is a binary variable that records 
whether a single decision either does or does not use legal scholarship, 
though there are other possible measures for use.30 
The statistical work reported here was performed in Excel, Statplus, or 
Stata. 
II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The analysis of our results begins, in Part II.A, by using the data to 
provide a foundational descriptive account of the Supreme Court’s use of 
legal scholarship. Part II.B builds from Part II.A by developing evidence 
about the nature and quality of the Court’s use of scholarship. Part II.C sets 
out a more holistic analysis of the meaning of our results. To give the reader 
a sense of where that analysis is headed, however, and thus a perspective 
from which to view the results as they are presented, we think the evidence 
we have developed establishes the hypothesis that the Court31 uses legal 
scholarship rather a lot; and, moreover, uses it systematically to support the 
decisional lawmaking process. 
A. Central Measures and Trends in the Supreme Court’s Use of 
Legal Scholarship 
To get a broad perspective on the use of legal scholarship by the 
Supreme Court, we calculated the proportion of decisions using at least one 
piece of legal scholarship and found that the Court uses legal scholarship in 
32.21% of its decisions, as reported in Table 1. In other words, the Court 
uses legal scholarship in roughly 1 of every 3 decisions. 
 
 
30  For example, instead of measuring scholarship use by decision, one might measure use by each 
separate opinion that comprises a decision, by word in a decision, or by paragraph in a decision, or by 
page in the United States Reports. Measures larger than a decision are also possible, for example, use by 
volume of the United States Reports, by Term, or by calendar year. Some argument can probably be 
made for using any of these different measures. 
31  We do not here make a claim about the extent to which our results are generalizable to, e.g., 
circuit courts of appeals. 
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TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS USING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Court n = Decisions Decisions Using % Decisions Using 
Supreme Court 
(1949–2009) 
7730 2490 32.21% 
 
Over the sixty-one-year period studied, the Court issued 7730 reported 
decisions and (not counting repeated uses of the same article in the same 
writing) cited law review articles 8152 times. As Table 2 shows below, that 
means the Court uses more than one piece of legal scholarship, on average, 
each time it takes pen to paper (or fingers to keys as the case may be) to 
author a reported decision. 
TABLE 2: NUMBER OF DISTINCT ARTICLES USED PER SUPREME COURT DECISION 




7730 8152 1.05 
 
What are perhaps the most popular empirical studies of the Court’s use 
of legal scholarship claim a “substantial” and “continuing” decline in the 
frequency with which the Court uses scholarship.32 We examined that claim. 
Figure 1 shows the average percentage of the Court’s decisions citing legal 
scholarship over the last sixty-one years. The range of use spans from a low 
of 2.0% to a high of 68.0% if one uses a 50-decision moving average, and 
spans from a low of 9.6% to a high of 54.8% if one uses a 250-decision 
moving average. 
 
32  See Sirico, supra note 7 (“We find a continuing decline in [the] number of times the Court cited 
legal periodicals . . . .”); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of Law Reviews by the 
Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 134 (1986) (examining two three-year 
periods and finding a “substantial” decline in citations to legal periodicals by the Supreme Court); see 
also Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 5 (studying the 2003 Term and claiming that the “trend” toward 
“not merely unhelpful, but useless to the bench and bar” legal scholarship is “already apparent” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). For an enterprising student note resisting this conventional wisdom, see 
Pierce & Reuben, supra note 7, at 1202–06. 
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF SUPREME COURT 




















The most straightforward interpretation of Figure 1 is that the long-
term trend in Supreme Court use of legal scholarship is unmistakably 
upwards.34 Moreover, while Figure 1 shows that there is variability in the 
Court’s use of scholarship, we do not consider the time trend depicted in 
Figure 1 as indicative of a “continuing” or “substantial” decline.35 In fact, 
when one recalls that the overall average number of decisions using legal 
 
33  Figure 1 shows the average percentage of reported Supreme Court decisions using legal 
scholarship from 1949–2009. The ordinate reports both a 50-decision moving average (50Mov) and a 
250-decision moving average (250Mov). On the abscissa, the year studied (Year) moves from left to 
right and gives a sense of the movement in the average percentage of opinions using legal scholarship 
over time. To further describe the long-term trend, average percentage 50Mov was regressed on time. 
The slope of the least squares line (the line is not shown to avoid cluttering the figure) is positive and 
very strongly significant, suggesting an upward trend in decisions using legal scholarship over time. The 
trend line has the following statistical characteristics: R2 = .326, tobs = 61.006, p < .001. Moving averages 
were calculated in Excel, as was the regression. Years are not uniformly spaced across the abscissa 
because of variation in the number of decisions the Court authored per year during the time studied. In 
other words, a larger amount of space between two sets of years indicates that the Court issues a greater 
number of decisions during that timeframe. 
34  See also supra note 33 (reporting the results of regressing of 50Mov on time). 
35  This is so even beginning at 1971, the point at which Louis Sirico and Jeffrey Margulies provide 
their earliest measurements. See Sirico, supra note 7; Sirico & Margulies, supra note 32. The significant 
decline reported in earlier studies can be partially attributed to differences in the methodologies used. 
See Pierce & Reuben, supra note 7, at 1194–99. 
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scholarship is 32.21%, we think it possible that Figure 1 depicts a trend that 
might be varying around a mean of just over a full third of reported 
decisions. 
Similarly, we examined the trend in the average number (not counting 
repeated uses of the same article in the same opinion) of articles used per 
reported decision. Figure 2 shows this information for the last sixty-one 
years. The range of use spans from a low of .02 articles to a high of 3.62 
articles for the 50-decision moving average, and spans from a low of .14 
articles to a high of 2.05 for the 250-decision moving average. 
FIGURE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF DISTINCT ARTICLES USED PER 




















36  Figure 2 shows the average number of distinct law review and law journal type articles used per 
reported decisions by the Supreme Court from 1949–2009. Articles are “distinct” in the sense that they 
were counted so that the repeated citation to the same article in a Justice’s writing was counted only one 
time. The ordinate reports both a 50-decision moving average and a 250-decision moving average. On 
the abscissa, the year (Year) studied moves from left to right and gives a sense of the movement in the 
average percentage of decisions using legal scholarship over time. To further describe the long-term 
trend, average percentage 50Mov was regressed on time. The slope of the least squares line (the line is 
not shown to avoid cluttering the figure) is positive and very strongly significant, suggesting an upward 
trend in decisions using legal scholarship over time. The trend line has the following statistical 
characteristics: R2 = .141, tobs = 51.680, p < .001. Moving averages were calculated in Excel, as was the 
regression. 
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It is difficult to interpret these data as suggesting a “continuing” or 
“substantial” decline in the Court’s use of scholarship over time.37 Even if 
one ignores the first fifteen or so years worth of data, which appears to be a 
time when the Court used comparatively few articles per reported decision, 
Figure 2 suggests an even, if variable, trend in use of articles. When one 
recalls that the overall historical mean is 1.05, the observed pattern might 
well indicate a trend varying around a mean in the low 1s, perhaps between 
1.10 and 1.40—or just over one article cited per reported decision. 
B. The Nature and Quality of the Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship 
In Part II.B, we build on the observations made above in Part II.A by 
examining the Supreme Court’s use of legal scholarship at a more granular 
level. Our purpose in this Part is to contribute to the knowledge concerning 
the use of scholarship by courts that is often informally spoken of, but 
which has almost no content. The information we provide here is directed to 
“how,” beyond mere citation, courts use legal scholarship. 
We were concerned in particular with whether scholarship might be 
systematically used to support the decisional lawmaking process. We 
reasoned that if the Court did use legal scholarship to support the decisional 
lawmaking process, scholarship might be most useful—and its use thus 
most common—in cases that were more important or difficult to decide. 
Our design examines this hypothesis: It evaluates the content of the Court’s 
jurisprudence for evidence that the Court uses scholarship 
disproportionately more often when cases are either more important or more 
difficult to decide. As we discuss below, we used theoretical considerations, 
and a realistic view of the data we could collect, to identify decisional 
characteristics that might indicate that a case is more important or more 
difficult to decide. We then examined the frequency of use of scholarship in 
cases having those characteristics. To encourage robustness, we explored a 
variety of decisional characteristics. The analysis is based on a multiple 
regression model, which allows us to explore the contribution of multiple 
variables—“predictor,” “explanatory,” or “independent” variables—to an 
outcome—a “response” or “dependent” variable. The outcome of interest is 
whether a Supreme Court decision uses legal scholarship. 
Table 3 reports the decisional characteristics that significantly predict 
whether a decision expressly evinces the use of legal scholarship. 
 
37  As above, this is the case even beginning at 1971, the point at which Sirico and Margulies 
provide their earliest measurements. See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 32. 
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TABLE 3: DECISIONAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT SIGNIFICANTLY PREDICT THE USE OF LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP BY THE SUPREME COURT: 1949–200938 
Explanatory Var. Brief Description % ∆ in Odds 
1minvote One minority vote attends decision 73.54*** 
2minvotes Two minority votes attend decision 104.36*** 
3minvotes Three minority votes attend decision 163.13*** 
4minvotes Four minority votes attend decision 224.75*** 
altersprec Decision evinces alteration of precedent 177.10*** 
junedec Decision issues in June 22.71*** 
decluncl Decision declares law unconstitutional 42.10** 
lctdissent Decision indicates lower court dissent 21.30** 
1. More Minority Votes Means More Use of Legal Scholarship.—We 
examined the impact of the number of minority votes attending a decision 
for a number of reasons. First, we conjectured that the presence of minority 
votes provides a rough approximation of the level of disagreement about an 
issue and thus might signal a context in which Justices are marginally more 
motivated to establish that they are “right,” perhaps by resort to legal 
scholarship. Not exclusive of that reason, we conjectured that minority 
votes could also indicate cases in which Justices are more at liberty to 
disagree. In other words, minority votes could locate cases where the range 
of decisional alternatives is marginally less constrained by existing 
precedent, making possible the marginally greater use of different kinds of 
information (e.g., legal scholarship) in the decisional process. 
Another reason we considered is that minority votes correlate with 
dissenting writings. Scholarship could sometimes be used in dissents to 
create a perception that arguments were fully heard and affected the 
 
38  Table 3 reports part of a logistic regression model that predicts bincite, a variable that is positive 
when a reported decision of the Supreme Court uses legal scholarship. The set of explanatory variables 
listed in the first column includes: #minvotes—the specified number of minority votes in a reported 
decision, e.g., 2minvotes means that two Justices dissented from the merits of an opinion of the Court; 
altersprec—a binary variable that is positive when a reported decision evinces the overruling of the 
Court’s own precedent; junedec—a binary variable that is positive when a reported decision issues in the 
month of June; decluncl—a binary variable that is positive when a reported decision declares an act of 
Congress, a state law, or a local ordinance unconstitutional; lctdissent—a binary variable that is positive 
when the reported decision includes the review of a lower court decision that contains a dissent. 
Evidence of the direction and magnitude of the effect of a variable on the Court’s use of legal 
scholarship is perhaps most easily interpreted by looking to the “% ∆ in Odds” column in Table 3, which 
reports the percent of change in the odds that a decision uses legal scholarship when the explanatory 
variable is positive. All of the predictors in Table 3 are strongly statistically significant in view of the 
convention that p = .05 is the threshold for statistical significance. R2 (Nagelkerke’s) = .177, df = 88. 
Indicator variables were used to fix time effects, issue-type effects, and, to some extent, variation in the 
amount of existing scholarship related to certain issues. A more complete description of the models can 
be found in the Appendix. Significance is indicated by normal conventions, viz. (†), p ≤ .1; (*), p ≤ .05; 
(**), p ≤ .01; and (***), p ≤ .001. 
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thinking of at least some of the Justices and thus to help soften the blow for 
parties on the losing side of an issue. We also speculated that minority 
writings might sometimes be for the benefit of courts (or legislators) in the 
future. For example, if in time it appears that the majority view is not 
working well, well-crafted dissents may be useful as support for 
distinguishing or even formally altering decisional law in the future. 
Scholarship could play a role in making a dissent more convincing, and 
therefore more likely to impact the law in the future. 
Thus, our rough working hypothesis was that if the Court uses 
scholarship for the reasons just discussed,39 we might expect decisions 
evincing minority votes to predict an increase in the use of legal 
scholarship. On the other hand, if legal scholarship is useless or irrelevant 
to decisional lawmaking, then we would expect to see no predictive 
relationship between minority votes and the Court’s use of scholarship. 
Scholarship might instead be randomly distributed across all decisions, 
irrespective of minority votes. 
We found a very strongly significant relationship between the use of 
scholarship and the number of minority votes. The “% ∆ in Odds” column 
in Table 3 shows that each additional minority vote made in connection 
with a decision (#minvotes) predicts an overall increase in the odds that the 
Court will use scholarship in its decision: one minority vote predicts a 
73.54% increase; two minority votes predict a 104.36% increase overall; 
three minority votes predicts a 163.13% increase overall; and four minority 
votes predicts a 224.75% increase overall. 
Table 4 provides another description of how the use of legal 
scholarship increases as the number of minority votes increases. It depicts 
the actual increase in use of scholarship predicted by the regression, and is 
helpful in describing two additional results that were very surprising in the 
sense that they surpassed our intuitions. The first is a doubling in the 
percentage of decisions using legal scholarship between opinions that have 
no minority votes (22.01%) and those that have four minority votes 
(45.72%). The second surprising result is the incremental increase in use 
that accompanies each additional minority vote. 
 
39  Or others that come to mind, such as using an alternative writing to help criticize an opinion for 
the Court, or even perhaps to help describe the opinion’s potential scope. 
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TABLE 4: USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY THE SUPREME COURT, 
NUMBER OF MINORITY VOTES: 1949–2009 
#minvotes Not Using Using % Using 
0 2378 671 22.01% 
1 651 285 30.45% 
2 773 408 34.55% 
3 797 586 42.37% 
4 641 540 45.72% 
Total Decisions 5240 2490 32.21% 
2. Altering Precedent.—We speculated that opinions evincing an 
overruling40 of the Court’s own precedent are something of a big deal. For 
example, if the Court has a preference for the appearance of stability and 
continuity in its jurisprudence,41 decisions upsetting that appearance may be 
perceived as being of special importance. They risk upsetting settled 
expectations, increasing uncertainty,42 and creating the perception that the 
Court is unilaterally making up the law. 
Because precedent is what is being cast off in decisions that alter 
precedent, other precedent might be less effective in supporting decisions 
that likely already require heightened justification and that leave society, 
the Court, and its jurisprudence vulnerable to the risks just mentioned. In 
such instances, scholarship might help to manage that risk by serving a sort 
of evidentiary purpose. The use of scholarship could help show that the 
change the Court is making, while perhaps disruptive or uncertainty-
creating, has been the subject of serious investigation and discussion. Thus 
the Court might use scholarship to encourage the perception that precedent-
altering change is the result of orderly review, as opposed to haphazard 
disregard or ideologically driven impulse. Somewhat similarly, using legal 
scholarship might serve the purpose of making the decision seem more 
 
40  An “overruling” decision should be differentiated from a decision that merely “distinguishes” 
precedent. 
41  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (“[T]he very 
concept of the rule of law underlying our Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect 
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. . . . [W]hen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its 
judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test 
the consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law . . . .”). 
42  On the other hand, an affirmative decision overruling past (ambiguous) decisions leads to a 
perception of clarification of the past decisions that could constrain the flexibility of decisional 
rationales available to all judges through judicial interpretation and discretionary powers. Some Justices 
might be chary of relinquishing the decisional flexibility that ambiguous precedent offers. This might 
suggest a relationship between the number of minority votes and decisions that formally overrule past 
decisions. But an evaluation for colinearity (an examination of the variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
tolerances for the relevant variables) suggested the relationship between the two decisional 
characteristics was weak, perhaps reflecting a compromise between the two sides of decisions involving 
substantial disagreement. 
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formal than it might otherwise. In the same vein, legal scholarship might be 
used as evidence of normative support—“votes” by legal thinkers in favor 
of the Court’s decision to change the law. In other words, scholarship might 
be used to add heft to a decision. 
Consistent with the idea that decisions overruling the Court’s own 
precedent are important, we observed that such decisions are relatively rare, 
accounting for only 1.88% (145) of all reported decisions between 1949 and 
2009 (7730). This relatively small number may highlight our postulate, viz., 
the marginal importance of such decisions. We thus conjectured that if the 
Court is using legal scholarship to support precedent-altering decisions, we 
might expect to find that decisions that evince the overruling of the Court’s 
own precedent predict an increase in the use of legal scholarship. If the 
Court is not so using scholarship, then we might expect to see no 
relationship between the decisional characteristic and the use of scholarship 
by the Court. 
We found a very strongly significant predictive relationship between 
decisions that indicate they overrule the Court’s own precedent and the use 
of legal scholarship. Table 3 shows that decisions that indicate that the 
Justices have altered precedent (altersprec) predict a 177.10% increase in 
the odds of the use of legal scholarship. Described in terms other than 
regression coefficients, decisions that overrule existing precedent use 
scholarship 63.45% of the time—almost twice as much as the overall rate of 
use across the last sixty-one years. 
3. June Decisions.—Based on an informal poll of law professor 
colleagues, we discovered that, while there is not unanimity of opinion, 
there is a common thought that the Court issues a greater mass of decisions 
that are either more important or more difficult to decide during the month 
of June.43 The working hypothesis here was straightforward: If legal 
scholarship aids decisions in important or difficult cases, and the most 
important or most difficult decisions typically issue in June, then decisions 
that issue in June might predict the use of legal scholarship. 
They do. The Court’s use of scholarship does not appear to be 
randomly sprinkled across all decisions, but—assuming the conventional 
wisdom is correct—seems to depend on a decision’s importance or 
difficulty. Table 3 shows a strongly significant predictive relationship 
between June decisions (junedec) and the use of legal scholarship by the 
Court. Table 5 puts this finding in greater relief and shows that more than 
half (52.65%) of all decisions using legal scholarship are issued in the 
months of May, June, and July, with the surprising result that the rate of use 
of scholarship is even more markedly pronounced in decisions that issue in 
July (55.56%). The findings for May, June, and July stand in sharp contrast 
 
43  The Supreme Court announces decisions into early July. Thus the theory is that the Court waits to 
decide the most difficult cases until the very end of the Term. 
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to those from August, September, October, November, and December, 
which together account for a grand total of 7.90% of all decisions using 
legal scholarship, and during which the monthly rate of use of scholarship is 
well below average. 
TABLE 5: USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY THE SUPREME COURT, 
MONTH OF DECISION: 1949–2009 
monthdec Not Using Using % Using 
Jan. 553 243 30.53% 
Feb. 464 196 29.70% 
Mar. 663 304 31.44% 
Apr. 587 247 29.62% 
May 665 343 34.03% 
June 1358 893 39.67% 
July 60 75 55.56% 
Aug. 1 0 0.00% 
Sept. 2 1 33.33% 
Oct. 149 1 0.67% 
Nov. 328 61 15.68% 
Dec. 410 126 23.51% 
Total Decisions 5240 2490 32.21% 
4. Declaring Laws Unconstitutional.—Depending on the rationale 
provided, a decision declaring an act of Congress, a state law, or a local 
ordinance unconstitutional may be a precedent the Court will be faced with 
for some time. Moreover, when the Court declares an act of Congress or a 
state law unconstitutional, it is perhaps placing its own constitutional 
position in greatest jeopardy because it may often be contradicting the will 
of a majority of Americans and a majority of their elected representatives. 
Declarations of unconstitutionality may thus represent marginally more 
difficult decisions and the Court may seek to execute them with special 
finesse and care. In addition, Justices may perceive decisions on the 
constitutionality of a law as an important part of their legacy. Either way, 
decisions characterized by a declaration of unconstitutionality might 
engender some of the Court’s best efforts to fully articulate and justify its 
rationales. 
For reasons largely cumulative to those given for decisions that alter 
precedent, the conjecture here is: If the Court is using legal scholarship to 
support declarations of unconstitutionality, we might expect decisions 
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declaring acts of Congress, state laws, or local ordinances unconstitutional 
to predict an increase in the use of legal scholarship.44 
In the 7730 decisions of the Court comprising the data set, 506 
declared an act of Congress, a state law, or a local ordinance 
unconstitutional. When a decision did not declare a law unconstitutional, it 
used legal scholarship 31.12% of the time, or just under the sixty-one-year 
average of 32.21%. When an act of Congress was declared unconstitutional, 
legal scholarship was used 56.41% of the time; when a state law was 
declared unconstitutional, legal scholarship was used 45.50% of the time; 
and when a local ordinance was declared unconstitutional, legal scholarship 
was used 52% of the time. Overall, Table 3 shows that declarations of 
unconstitutionality (decluncl) predict a 42.10% increase in the odds that a 
decision of the Court will use legal scholarship. 
5. Lower Court Disagreements.—Lower court disagreements refer to 
a fairly specific decisional characteristic: they represent decisions in which 
the opinion for the Supreme Court—the majority opinion—mentions that 
there is a dissent in the decision the Court has taken for review. We 
included this variable primarily because we supposed it might be a marginal 
signal that the Court viewed the relevant law as unsettled in some way, i.e., 
there was a legitimate dispute as to its content that could be clarified by its 
decision. 
Accordingly, we speculated that if the Court uses scholarship to 
reconcile disputes between the lower courts, or the judges within a circuit, 
as to the content of the law, then lower court disagreements might predict 
the use of legal scholarship. 
Table 3 shows that lower court disagreement (lctdissent) is a strongly 
significant predictor of the use of legal scholarship, increasing the odds of 
use by 21.30%. In terms of real numbers, when a decision evinces a lower 
court disagreement, it uses scholarship 39.36% of the time, and when a 
decision does not, it uses scholarship just 30.35% of the time, a difference 
of roughly 9%; a decrease from use in 1 of every 2.54 decisions to use in 1 
of every 3.29 decisions. 
 
44  A concern here is that there may be a greater amount of total scholarship directed to 
constitutional issues as compared to other issues, which might impact the relative rates of use of 
scholarship in these sorts of cases. We attempted to statistically control for this likelihood using 
variables that indicated whether the decisions involved aspects of constitutional questions. The variables 
are Spaeth-coded variables that indicate the type of law involved, including: constitution, constitutional 
amendment, federal statute, and court rules. See, e.g., Downloadable Code Book: 2011 Release 03, 
supra note 22, § 40. We also employed issue area indicator variables. We doubt these controls are 
perfect, but for many the potential concern of a disproportionate amount of scholarship directed to 
constitutional issues may not be that important. 
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C. What Does It All Mean? 
We think the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence we have 
developed is that the Supreme Court not only often uses legal scholarship in 
decisions it issues, it also disproportionately uses legal scholarship when 
cases are either more important or more difficult to decide. In fact, we think 
the evidence reasonably leads to an interpretation of the Court’s use of 
scholarship that is strongly contrary to the claim that courts and 
practitioners have little use for it. In Part II.C, we explain our interpretation, 
which we think is empirically robust. 
1. The Court Uses a Lot of Scholarship and Uses It to Support 
Decisional Lawmaking.—Part of our interpretation of the data is 
that the Court uses legal scholarship “rather a lot.” What could that mean? 
After all, characterizing use as “a lot” or, as has been the case in existing 
literature, “infrequent,”45 suggests a reference to some kind of expectation. 
In addition, we interpret the data to mean that the Court uses scholarship 
“systematically to support the decisional lawmaking process.” While that 
interpretation is somewhat clearer on its face, it too could be made more 
useful by relating it to some kind of expectation. 
Developing an expectation for the precisely “right” amount and quality 
of use of scholarship is beyond the scope of this study, and we think the 
task might be rather difficult, presenting both conceptual and empirical 
challenges. So instead of coming to rest on precise expectations, we frame 
our claim qualitatively, in the context of three distinct sources of 
expectation for the amount and quality of use of scholarship. 
a. Judges.—Perhaps the most outspoken members of the federal 
judiciary have made claims such as the following: “[not] particularly 
helpful for practitioners and judges”;46 “[of] little use” to “judges, 
administrators, legislators, and practitioners”;47 “No one speaks of [law 
reviews]. No one relies on them”;48 and, they are “of no use or interest to 
people who actually practice law.”49 We think these and similar claims are 
fairly summarized as: Legal scholarship is useless and irrelevant to the 
bench, and therefore is not used very much. 
 
45  See, e.g., Ambro, supra note 4, at 549 (claiming that attempts by the judiciary to locate legal 
articles “or even to review those cited in briefs” is an “infrequent” occurrence); Hricik & Salzmann, 
supra note 5, at 778 (reporting that judges “infrequent[ly]” use legal scholarship in their decisional 
process); id. at 763 n.7 (complaining that law professors “too infrequently” publish the “much-needed” 
legal scholarship); Kaye, supra note 4, at 320 n.33 (“all-to-infrequent”); Sirico, supra note 7, at 1010 
(referencing a “group of infrequently cited” legal journals). 
46  Bravin, supra note 2. 
47  Edwards, supra note 4. 
48  Liptak, supra note 4. 
49  Liptak, supra note 1. 
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A comparison of that claim to the empirical evidence gathered from 
Supreme Court decisions reveals a sharp contrast. Over the last 61 years the 
Court has used legal scholarship in essentially 1 of every 3 decisions. The 
overall trend in use has been either upward or, if one ignores the oldest 15–
20 years worth of data, perhaps even.50 And, on average, the Court uses 
more than one law review article every time it puts pen to paper (or fingers 
to keys) to author a reported decision.51 
Moreover, as each additional minority vote attaches to a decision the 
likelihood of scholarship being used increases significantly and steadily, 
rising from 22.01% in decisions with no minority votes to 45.72% in 
opinions that have four minority votes.52 Decisions that effectively state that 
they alter precedent also predict a strongly significant increase in the odds 
of the use of scholarship. In terms of raw numbers, over the period studied, 
decisions that overrule existing precedent use scholarship at a rate of 
63.45%,53 in roughly 2 of every 3 decisions, while the overall rate of use 
across the period is only 32.21%.54 June decisions, suspected to represent 
the largest number of decisions considering important or difficult issues, are 
strongly significant predictors of the use of legal scholarship.55 Decisions 
that declare acts of Congress, state laws, or municipal ordinances 
unconstitutional predict an increase in the use of scholarship, and the 
authoring Justices use scholarship over half of the time in such cases.56 In 
addition, decisions that reconcile disputes between the lower courts or the 
judges within a circuit as to the content of the law also predict an increase 
in the odds that a decision uses legal scholarship.57 
In view of these many and varied measures of use, our judgment is that 
the weight of the existing evidence is against claims that legal scholarship is 
irrelevant to and not used by the judiciary. Accordingly, by the measure of 
judicial commentary directed to the uselessness and lack of relevance of 
legal scholarship to courts and practitioners, it seems to us that legal 
scholarship is neither useless nor irrelevant, but rather is used—at least by 
Supreme Court Justices—quite a bit. 
b. Literature.—Another point of comparison is the existing 
literature. That literature evinces a conventional wisdom that there has been 
a continuing and substantial decline in the use of legal scholarship by the 
 
50  See supra Figures 1, 2. 
51  See supra Table 2. 
52  See supra Part II.B.1 and Tables 3, 4. 
53  See supra Part II.B.2 and Table 3. 
54  See supra Table 1. 
55  See supra Part II.B.3 and Tables 3, 5. 
56  See supra Part II.B.4 and Table 3. 
57  See supra Part II.B.5 and Table 3. 
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Supreme Court58 and that legal scholarship is “not merely unhelpful” but 
“‘useless’ to the bench and bar.”59 
Our findings are strongly contrary to the literature-created expectations 
for use of scholarship. The evidence is essentially the same as that 
described above in connection with judge-authored claims about 
scholarship: consistent use; use in a third of decisions; an upward trend in 
use; and increased use in important decisions, such as when decisions are 
closely decided, when decisions alter precedent, and when decisions 
determine law or other conduct to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, we 
think that reasonable people can see the evidence we report here, when 
compared to the research underlying the existing literature60 on this topic, as 
supporting a conclusion altogether different than the conventional wisdom, 
in particular, that the extent of the Court’s use of scholarship far exceeds the 
literature-advertised expectations both in terms of its amount and quality. 
c. History, common sense, and intuition.—Our final argument 
appeals most directly to the reader’s own common sense and intuitions. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate a general upward trend in use of scholarship across 
the period studied. A holistic look at those Figures suggests the 
interpretation that after some low-use years in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Supreme Court has used scholarship at a fairly consistent rate.61 Indeed, if 
one ignores the first twenty years of data and focuses on the part of the data 
from about 1970 to the present, what appears to us is a moving average that 
might well be varying around a mean that is very close to the Court’s 
current level of use of scholarship, viz., in about a third of all decisions.62 
Accordingly, we offer the suggestion that the level of use depicted in 
those Figures reflects a natural level of use that has not changed all that 
much over time and may, in fact, reflect the normative baseline for use of 
scholarship by the Supreme Court. In any event, Figures 1 and 2 do not 
strongly suggest that there was a “good old days” when the Court used a lot 
more scholarship than it does today.63 
A final point to make in connection with this subpart is to query the 
common sense and intuition of the reader. Is it really a realistic expectation 
that the Court will use a law review article in every decision? We think the 
 
58  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
59  Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60  It is important to note that we reach this conclusion while at the same time accepting that earlier 
work was faithfully performed and executed. We do not think, for example, that earlier studies made 
mistakes in terms of counting citations. What distinguishes our work from earlier work is the 
methodology we have been able to bring to bear and the amount of data we have been able to gather and 
analyze under the concept analysis model. 
61  See supra Figures 1, 2. 
62  See supra Figures 1, 2. 
63  Although, depending on the definition of “use” employed, they do not conclusively rule out the 
possibility. 
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answer is: Probably not. After all, it is Law 101 that the facts and relevant 
precedent attending any given legal case are developed through an 
adversarial process that is supposed to define the scope of what informs a 
judicial decision. Legal scholarship in the form of law review and law 
journal articles are not precedent and should, at best, be of modest direct 
assistance to the adversarial process. But even assuming that legal 
scholarship might be brought to bear on a case on questions of law or 
policy—and thus have direct, observable influence despite the limitations 
imposed by the formalistic adversarial process that defines a case—is it so 
for all cases the Court hears, or just a fraction? And if it is a fraction, what 
is the fraction? Do you think it is much more than 33%? 
d. Other explanations.—Recall that we relied on hypotheses 
about the relationships between decisional characteristics and the use of 
legal scholarship to identify decisional characteristics that might be 
probative of the Court’s use of scholarship “beyond mere citation.”64 In our 
hypothesizing, we were not necessarily able to exclude all other possible 
explanations for why we might observe a predictive effect for a decisional 
characteristic.65 Instead, part of the design was to test an abundance of ideas 
and potential relationships to develop empirically robust evidence of use 
beyond mere citation. If even one of the decisional characteristics we 
associate with importance or difficulty genuinely associates with 
importance or difficulty, and if one accepts that a heightened use of 
scholarship in decisions that are more important or difficult is evidence that 
the Court uses scholarship to support decisional lawmaking, then our 
hypothesis finds support. 
Our interpretation is therefore probably most vulnerable to a single 
explanation capable of convincingly demonstrating why all of our 
observations are not related to the importance of difficulty of a decision. 
Our study design attempts to statistically account for some concerns of this 
nature by using indicator variables to control for the impact of certain 
factors that might lead to competing interpretations. For instance, we use 
indicator variables for the Term in which the decision issued to address 
temporal effects. We also use indicator variables to attempt to control for 
the issues involved in decisions and to control for the type of law 
involved.66 Accounting for these effects does not change the substance of 
our results. 
 
64  Supra Part II.B. 
65  Although it is the case that, in view of the model we plan to use, we believe that if we observed a 
predictive effect for a decisional characteristic, then the most likely explanation is the use of scholarship 
to support decisional lawmaking. 
66  We also think that these indicators should have some effect on concerns about the amount of 
legal scholarship available addressing different issues and types of law. 
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At bottom, we have not come up with a more reasonable interpretation 
for our observations than the one we have presented. If we had, we would 
say so. But empirical work is iterative,67 and future work should be 
performed to test, substantiate, and build on our results. 
2. What Does the Court Take from Scholarship?—What does the 
Court take from legal scholarship when using it in a decision? We think our 
results suggest a number of possibilities, although they are not very helpful 
in ruling any of those possibilities out. In fact, we think it quite probable 
that all of the things we set out below happen, at least to some extent.68 
Among the possibilities is that the Court is taking doctrine or policy 
changes proposed by the scholarship. The Court might expressly or 
impliedly incorporate these recommendations into its decisions. Similarly, 
perhaps the Court discovers in a piece (or pieces) of scholarship its 
analytical approach to an issue. Also in this category might be the use of 
scholarship as the source of a straw man or foil against which the Court 
could rationalize its decision. 
Our results are consistent with the possibility that the Court is taking 
prestige of some sort when it uses legal scholarship. It might take the 
prestige of the author, e.g., it might cite Kimberly West-Faulcon’s article, 
The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action 
Laws,69 because she is a prominent constitutional law scholar. Alternatively, 
it might cite the same article to take the prestige of the publishing law 
review or the institution affiliated with the law review, in this case, the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review or the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School. A similar point is that the Court is taking the “vote” of the 
piece. In other words, legal scholarship might be used as evidence of 
normative support—“votes” by legal thinkers in favor of whatever the 
Court happens to be saying when it makes the use, or perhaps in some cases 
even in favor of the ultimate conclusion the Court will reach. Here, the 
prestige of the scholar, publication, or law school is not absolutely crucial, 
although the greater the prestige perhaps the more desirable the scholarship 
for this sort of use by the Court. Rather, the reason the Court uses the 
scholarship is to seem not to be an outlier, to be able to point to at least one 
other person who agrees with whatever point the opinion writer wants to 
make. In either event, however, the scholarship might be used mostly to 
support a specific proposition or to add heft to the general reasoning or 
analytical process used by a Justice to support a written conclusion. 
 
67  A concern ubiquitous to studies of this type is that there may be some problem with the study that 
we have not detected. 
68  Nor do we think this discussion is exhaustive of all of the things the Court might be taking when 
it uses scholarship. 
69  See Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative 
Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1075 (2009). 
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Another possibility is that the Court is using legal scholarship to 
encourage a perception about judicial decisionmaking. More specifically, 
perhaps the Court cites scholarship due to the fact that it was used as part of 
the parties’ advocacy.70 The basic idea is that some of the use of scholarship 
we observed can be explained by differences in the extent to which the bar 
and interest groups (including law professors at times) use scholarship in 
connection with advocacy before the Court. For example, when advocates 
use scholarship, perhaps some of the time the Court “gives it back” to them 
in the expression of its decision. This interpretation has some intuitive 
appeal in the sense that the Court might want to create the perception that 
its decisionmaking is balanced, deliberative, and responsive to the 
arguments advanced by the parties.71 
To the extent that the use of scholarship by the bar is driving the 
Court’s citation of legal scholarship in decisional lawmaking, it suggests 
that scholarship is not just useful to the Court, but also to practitioners of 
law.72 Like the other explanations we provide, we think the possibility that 
the Court uses legal scholarship in response to its use by litigants and 
advocates73 may describe a process for how the use of scholarship can 
happen. But we do not think that all of the Court’s use of scholarship 
happens for this reason. To think this process explains all, or most, of what 
we observe requires explaining how it can be made to depend on the 
number of minority votes in an opinion so that Justices would use 
incrementally more scholarship for each additional minority vote. For that 
to happen, some things would have to come together, but it is not a logical 
impossibility. 
3. Why Derogate Scholarship?—We think the best interpretation of 
our results is that legal scholarship is not useless or irrelevant to the Court. 
So why are some leading figures in the federal judiciary derogating legal 
scholarship? A simple response to this question might be that they are 
simply unaware of the extent to which courts use scholarship. But if we 
assume for the moment that empirical claims—such as “[n]o one relies on 
[law reviews]”; or that law reviews “aren’t particularly helpful for 
practitioners and judges”; or that “[n]o one speaks of [law reviews]”; or that 
 
70  See, e.g., Manz, supra note 7, at 273 tbls.8, 9, & 10, 274 tbls.11 & 12, 274–75 tbl.13, 275 tbl.14 
(comparing the numbers and percentages of legal articles cited in briefs and opinions). 
71  Cf. Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness 
of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 132 (1988) (describing what is at least an analogous, 
if not identical, concept). 
72  This idea suggests that the legal scholarship is at least useful to those practitioners who are 
attentive to the Court’s decisions. For example, those who represent parties before the Court: private 
attorneys and corporate lawyers, special interest groups, amicus filers. 
73  To the extent that legal scholarship is not used by litigants and advocates, see supra notes 5–7, 
such a trend suggests the Court is finding scholarship on its own—further bolstering the idea that 
scholarship is neither useless nor irrelevant to the bench. 
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law reviews are “largely of no use or interest to people who actually 
practice law”74—are not made by accident, then other explanations are 
needed. Below we suggest a few. 
For the most part, federal judges are probably clever, ambitious, and 
politically savvy individuals. It seems likely, therefore, that their public 
statements are fairly calculated. Assuming that is true, then it might well be 
the case that when judges derogate legal scholarship they are doing so 
because derogating legal scholarship provides some kind of a benefit to 
them. 
What kind of benefit? Well, perhaps when judges derogate legal 
scholarship, they have a political purpose. Perhaps some judges perceive 
that their relationship with certain constituencies is improved when they 
derogate legal scholarship. For example, perhaps judges (or judge-hopefuls) 
think there is an advantage to be had in their relationship with the “judge 
makers” by distancing themselves from, or by being perceived as critical of, 
the legal academy. Since probably the early 1980s, it has likely not been 
helpful for a judicial nominee, or for sitting judges who might have 
ambitions to be elevated within the federal system, to appear to be too 
influenced by legal academics.75 If this is so, it may be that the political 
process that picks federal judges selects for judges who are dismissive of 
legal scholarship. 
Another benefit judges might get from talking down legal scholarship 
could involve their relationship with the bar. Judges might derogate legal 
scholarship for the time-tested reason that, when attempting to curry favor 
with one group (e.g., the bar), there is often political benefit in laying 
criticism or blame for problems on another group (e.g., legal academics). 
Thus, when a judge sits down with practitioners to discuss concerns about 
the state of the profession, he might criticize law reviews for the purpose of 
creating solidarity with practitioners. The thrust of the appeal is that the 
“disconnected intellectuals” of the academy are doing nothing at all to help 
with serious issues, while the judiciary is right in the thick of things with 
the practicing lawyers. 
A judge might also derogate legal scholarship to benefit the 
relationship that judge, or his court, has with the public generally. After all, 
much of the sustained criticism of the Court’s jurisprudence comes from the 
legal academy. One means of addressing the criticism is to dismiss the 
academy as a group of disconnected intellectuals who are not really clear on 
what is at stake and who are not trying hard to advance legal thinking. Once 
that label gets attached, it becomes rather easy to suggest that criticisms 
made by legal academics should not be taken very seriously in most cases. 
 
74  See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
75  See Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower: More Law Reviews Give Professors 
Places to Publish, but Judges Stick Up Their Noses at Elite and Useless Articles, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2012, at 
50. 
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Another possibility is that the judges who derogate legal scholarship 
mean to claim nothing more than that some (perhaps much) legal 
scholarship is uninteresting and unhelpful to them in deciding cases. This 
understanding has the merit of assuming that there is at least some 
empirical basis for the claims derogating legal scholarship. But if this is the 
explanation, then the claims themselves are intensely subjective and 
probably also contain significant conceptual limitations or confusion. 
One point of conceptual limitation stems from the form of argument. 
The most direct measure of the utility of scholarship to the bench and bar is 
how much use those entities make of it—directly or indirectly—and what 
benefit they get from that use, not how much scholarship exists in the 
world. Measuring the utility of scholarship to the bench and bar by looking 
at the scholarship they are not, or may not be,76 using is nothing more than 
looking for evidence of use and relevance in a place where the seeker is 
unlikely to find any. 
To use a fanciful analogy, we might begin to define how useful and 
relevant restaurants are to a person by measuring the frequency and the 
circumstances in which the person eats out. If we observed that the person 
eats out every third day, and does so in a variety of specific 
circumstances—e.g., when he is working late, or when the grocery stores do 
not have the ingredients he needs to prepare a meal himself—we might 
conclude that restaurants are useful and relevant to that person. Our view 
would probably not change much if we learned that the person does not 
often eat at Mexican restaurants. That does not mean it is uninformative to 
know there are restaurants at which the person does not often eat. One of 
the benefits of knowing that a person does not eat at, for example, Mexican 
restaurants is that we are encouraged to consider what forces maintain them. 
This observation leads to a second and more general point of conceptual 
confusion surrounding the debate over the utility of legal scholarship. 
The debate over the utility of scholarship seems to involve 
unarticulated—and perhaps unrealized—assumptions about the nature and 
purpose of legal scholarship. Just because, for example, a judge might flip 
through a few issues of the Harvard Law Review and not find something 
that he considers helpful to a case he has to decide—or, if he is a 
practitioner, to a case he is litigating—does not mean that law reviews are 
useless or irrelevant to judges, practitioners, legislators, or the development 
of law generally. Indeed, confining the definition of useful scholarship to 
only scholarship that warrants citation in the decision of a case or in the 
brief of a lawsuit is to so conceptually restrict the definition of useful 
scholarship that the conclusion that most scholarship is useless and 
irrelevant may almost be unavoidable. 
 
76  Given the discussion of “use,” supra Part I, it should be evident that this amount is generally 
unknown. 
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A person who engages this assumption is able to avoid altogether the 
notion that the process that produces information that they would probably 
agree is helpful to deciding a case involves legal thinkers debating and 
working through complex issues, the resolution of which may advance the 
law and, thereby, the human condition. In other words, pretty much all 
scholarship is built on other work, and at least some of the articles that 
critics of legal scholarship find “useless” and “irrelevant” to deciding cases 
may well have been very useful and relevant to articles that informed jurists 
and practitioners, and that are, in some instances, cited in decisions. 
Additionally, law review-type legal scholarship informs and influences 
judges and practitioners in many other ways. It helps to inform the content 
of the treatises to which judges, justices, and practitioners turn to discover 
the doctrinal law; it contributes to the content of law school classes, where 
judges, clerks, and practitioners are first taught how to distill and apply the 
law; it establishes the topics of discussion for Continuing Legal Education 
classes, for symposia judges and practitioners might attend, and for judge-
training classes (for example, in law and economics); it spurs debate and 
discussion of contemporary policy issues in newspaper editorials, and in 
television and radio broadcasts; and it contributes directly and indirectly to 
many of the other forms of information that affect the judgment that judges 
apply in every case. 
Nor are judges, practitioners, and legal scholars the only audience for 
legal scholarship. Some scholarship is directed to the public and to 
policymakers. With the growing popularity of blogs, legal scholars have 
begun summarizing and promoting their scholarship to wider audiences. 
Blog posts are read by large numbers of people outside of the legal 
academy, including many nonlawyers. Some blog posts are directly related 
to the legal scholarship of the author, while other posts are directly or 
indirectly influenced by debates among legal academics in law reviews. 
In addition, while there is almost certainly such a thing as “plug and 
play” scholarship—scholarship that judges can pick up and inexpensively 
incorporate directly into their decisional thinking or writing—some 
scholarship might take more effort. Indeed, part of the value of a piece of 
legal scholarship to a judge may be that it encourages and directs an effort 
to grapple with relevant or analogous ideas. Because its utility is in 
stimulating the mind, such work may not be suitable for citation, and it may 
only be useful to a judge who is capable of customizing its guidance to the 
specific, unique legal situation at hand. 
In light of this broad scope of examples illustrating the influence of 
law review-type legal scholarship on aspects only indirectly connected to 
the citations in opinions and briefs, it seems that at least some claims 
derogating legal scholarship might simply miscomprehend the 
denominator—they might make unjustified assumptions about the purpose 
and content of legal scholarship, its utility and relevance outside the realm 
of opinion drafting and brief writing, as well as about the effort needed to 
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use it. Once a rule is applied that every piece of legal scholarship must be 
useful in deciding or litigating a case, it is dangerously easy upon finding 
some scholarship not easily applied to that purpose to circle back to the 
conclusion that scholarship is valueless to the legal system.77 
 
 * * * 
 
Finally, we note that Chief Justice Roberts, whose criticisms of legal 
scholarship helped to inspire this project, uses legal scholarship in about a 
quarter (23.08%) of the opinions he authors. That rate does not differ 
significantly from the rates of the other current Justices.78 Table 6 shows the 
observed rate of use of legal scholarship by the current members of the 
Court. Table 7 shows the observed rate of use of legal scholarship by the 
Chief Justices between 1949 and 2010. 
 
TABLE 6: USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY THE CURRENT SUPREME COURT: THROUGH 201079 
Justice Not Using Using % Using 
J. Ginsburg 100 41 29.08% 
J. Alito 24 9 27.27% 
J. Scalia 175 60 25.53% 
J. Kennedy 161 52 24.41% 
C.J. Roberts 30 9 23.08% 
J. Breyer 107 26 19.55% 
J. Thomas 136 16 10.53% 
 
77  The discussion also demonstrates another point about this study and the analysis of courts’ use of 
scholarship generally. We have reason to know that, for part of the period studied, the number of law 
reviews increased. See Schwartz & Petherbridge, supra note 7, app. (including a variable for number of 
law reviews collected for each year). We believe that fact means that as time went on, Justices had more 
articles to select from. But, assuming we are correct, we do not think (except if some extreme, and 
presently unknown, facts were to be discovered) that fact much matters to the debate over the utility of 
legal scholarship to the bench and bar. The total amount of scholarship available is mostly irrelevant, 
and therefore mostly unhelpful, to the analysis—especially when it is used merely to inflate the 
denominator in an effort to contrast the amount the bench and bar use with the amount they do not. In 
fact, the only way the increased denominator could be said to reduce the utility of scholarship would be 
if, as a result of its existence, the bench and bar could not find the scholarship they desired to use. Given 
the Internet, blogging, and legal databases such as Lexis, Westlaw, and HeinOnline, and accepting that 
information technology has made searching ever easier, it is a struggle to believe that judges and 
lawyers cannot locate the scholarship they need to find. 
78  Without including Chief Justice Roberts, the average usage rate for the Justices of the current 
Court is 22.49%. The adjusted residual for Chief Justice Roberts’s is .086, evidence that his use of 
scholarship does not depart from what independence predicts for the data in Table 6. 
79  The data in Table 6 have been updated through June 29, 2010, and so extend about a year beyond 
the data used in the rest of this Article’s analysis. Justices Sotomayor and Kagan are not included 
because neither authored a substantial number of opinions—eight and zero, respectively—during the 
period studied. 
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TABLE 7: USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY 
CHIEF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT: 1949–201080 
Chief Justice Not Using Using % Using 
C.J. Vinson 36 7 16.28% 
C.J. Warren 123 47 27.65% 
C.J. Burger 187 71 27.52% 
C.J. Rehnquist 393 63 13.82% 
C.J. Roberts 30 9 23.08% 
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The work presented in this Article suggests a number of avenues for 
future work. Below, we offer several suggestions that we think should be 
fruitful in helping to understand the relationship between legal scholarship, 
the bench, the bar, and perhaps even policymakers. 
One of the major contributions of this work is that it provides evidence 
about how the Supreme Court uses scholarship. But it has not accounted for 
all measures of how scholarship is used, and future work should employ 
other measures of how scholarship is used. For example, this work 
identifies relationships that predict the use of scholarship and in so doing 
advances some possibilities about what the Court takes from scholarship 
when it uses it.81 Future work could focus on what, exactly, the Court uses 
when it reaches to legal scholarship. It should ask: When the Court uses 
scholarship, what aspects of the scholarship does it take (and in what 
proportions)? Such work would be useful to, among others, scholars who 
want to tailor their research and writing agendas to the Court specifically, 
or, perhaps, to courts more generally. 
Another area for future work is similar, except that it focuses 
somewhat more intently on scholarship. In particular, what type of 
scholarship is most useful to the Court? A frequent criticism of legal 
scholarship focuses on abstract and theoretical scholarship, as well as the 
“law and” types of scholarship.82 Future research is warranted into whether 
these types of articles are, in fact, infrequently used by the Court, and 
whether other types, such as doctrinal or empirical articles, are used more 
 
80  Table 7 shows the number of decisions using legal scholarship categorized by identity of the 
Chief Justice from 1949–2010. The data have been updated through June 29, 2010, and so extend about 
a year beyond the data used in the rest of this Article’s analysis, as indicated supra note 79. The 
relatively fewer number of decisions authored by Chief Justice Vinson can be attributed to the fact that 
his tenure began earlier than the time period studied (and ended soon after, in 1953). The relatively 
fewer number of decisions authored by Chief Justice Roberts can be attributed to the fact that his tenure 
began with the 2005 Term, which means that he has thus far been in office for less than half as long as 
the tenures of Chief Justices Warren, Burger, or Rehnquist. 
81  See supra Part II.C. 
82  See Edwards, supra note 4, at 34–35. 
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frequently. With a sufficiently disciplined coding scheme, the articles used 
by the Court can be classified and systematically analyzed. 
Still other future work could use the relationships this Article identifies 
as instruments to probe more deeply into the Court’s decisionmaking 
process. For example, we report that the Court uses legal scholarship more 
often when there are more minority votes attending a decision.83 Why does 
that happen? Are there patterns in the use of scholarship in opinions for the 
Court and in dissents that reveal relationships between Justices and issues, 
and between Justices and other Justices? The relationships we observe 
might be used as tools to see other relationships, such as between Justices 
and factors outside of the Court, including: institutional experiences, 
background, relationships to scholars, or education. Similarly, we observe 
that scholarship is used more often in decisions that declare laws 
unconstitutional.84 Beyond being evidence that the Court uses scholarship, 
the knowledge that scholarship is used more often in connection with 
declarations of unconstitutionality might provide a useful tool to begin to 
understand other relationships that impact the Court’s decisionmaking 
process. 
A related area of future work involves how the Court discovers the 
scholarship that it uses. It could come from any number of places, e.g., 
party briefing, amici, clerks in the course of research, symposia the Justices 
recently attended, library circulation, personal contacts (such as law 
professors or former clerks), independent research on the part of the Justice, 
and so on. Understanding how the Court locates scholarship (and the 
proportional contribution of different sources) is, again, useful to scholars 
who want to tailor their research and writing agendas. But it is also useful in 
a much more important way: It begins to shed light on how things from 
outside the judicial process—such as the events of the day, publicly known 
information, and trends in popular thinking—silently enter the judicial 
decisionmaking process. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides the results of an empirical study using an 
unprecedented body of data about the Supreme Court’s use of legal 
scholarship in decisions. It reports several surprising results and makes two 
major contributions. The first contribution concerns evidence describing the 
amount and patterns of the Court’s use of legal scholarship over the last 
sixty-one years. The second, and perhaps most striking, contribution of this 
Article is evidence on the nature and quality of the Court’s use of 
scholarship. 
 
83  See supra Part II.B.1. 
84  See supra Part II.B.4. 
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This Article provides the first empirical analysis, as far as we can 
determine, of evidence that the Supreme Court not only often uses legal 
scholarship, but it also disproportionately uses scholarship when cases are 
either more important or more difficult to decide. 
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APPENDIX 1 
VARIABLES USED IN THE STUDY 
Variable Type Brief Description Source 
bincite binary indicates whether decision cites 
any legal scholarship 
coded for study 
numcites interval counts number of citations in a 
decision 
coded for study 
minvotes interval counts number of minority 
votes in a decision 
Spaeth coded 
altersprec binary 
indicates whether a decision 




junedec binary indicates a decision issued in 
the month of June 
calcuated from Spaeth-
coded dates of issue 
decluncl binary 
indicates a decision that 
declares unconstitutional an act 





indicates whether decision 
evinces that lower court 









indicates whether lower court 




indicates whether Court 










law indicator category 
indicates legal provisions 
considered by the Court 
Spaeth coded 
(lawtype) 
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APPENDIX 2 
KAPPA VALUES AND INTERCODER RELIABILITY 
Coders (Terms) and Variables Coded kappa (k) 
PC cf. MR (341–350)  
bincite .9916 
numcites .9034 
MR cf. LF (351–360)  
bincite .9566 
numcites .9154 
LF cf. LL (381–400)  
bincite .9941 
numcites .8909 
LL cf. PC (441–450)  
bincite .9806 
numcites .8683 
AJ cf. LL (450–459)  
bincite 1.000 
numcites .9024 
LP cf. GS (491–493)  
bincite .9417 
numcites .9094 
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APPENDIX 3 
DECISIONAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT PREDICT THE USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY THE 
SUPREME COURT: 1949–200985 
Explanatory Variable 
(bincite) 








































































85  This Table reports a logistic regression model that predicts bincite—a variable that is positive 
when a reported decision of the Supreme Court uses legal scholarship. The explanatory variables 
include: #minvotes—a variable that represents the number of minority votes in a reported decision, e.g., 
2minvotes means that two Justices dissented from the merits of an opinion for the Court; altersprec—a 
binary variable that is positive when a reported decision evinces the overruling of the Court’s own 
precedent; junedec—a binary variable that is positive when a reported decision issues in the month of 
June; decluncl—a binary variable that is positive when a reported decision declares unconstitutional an 
act of Congress, state law, or local ordinance; lctdissent—a binary variable that is positive when the 
lower court decision reviewed by the Supreme Court contains a dissent; partywinning—a binary 
variable that is positive if the decision was favorable to the petitioner; lcdispdir—a binary variable that 
is positive if the direction of the lower court disposition was “liberal”; decdir—a binary variable that is 
positive if the direction of the Supreme Court’s decision was “liberal.” Indicator variables were used to 
fix time effects (term indicator), issue-area effects (issue indicator), law-type effects (law indicator), 
and, therefore, to some extent, variation in the amount of scholarship directed to certain issues. The 
values reported are odds ratios and (standard errors). Significance is indicated by normal conventions, 
viz., (†), p ≤ .1; (*), p ≤ .05; (**), p ≤ .01; and (***), p ≤ .001. 










term indicator   X 
issue indicator  X X 








df 11 28 88 
R2 .089 .091 .177 
#obs 7730 6529 6529 
 
 
